Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs by Pierce, Richard J., Jr.
I - ISSUES RAISED BY FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V. LAIDLAW - PIERCE.DOC 04/25/01 9:37 AM
207
ISSUES RAISED BY FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
V. LAIDLAW ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES:
ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.*
This article was written before the Supreme Court decided Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.  The author
then added a postscript in which he associates the actual opinions in
Laidlaw with the issues discussed in the article.
INTRODUCTION
I would like to take up the issues raised in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,1 a case now pending de-
cision in the Supreme Court.  Laidlaw raises a host of important is-
sues, any one of which could be the basis for the Court’s decision.  In
Part I, I will describe briefly the most significant facts in Laidlaw and
the most salient characteristics of the prior decisions of the district
court and the Fourth Circuit.  Upon that bare bones description of
the case, I will amplify in subsequent parts of the article where par-
ticular facts or characteristics of the lower court decisions are
noteworthy in evaluating issues raised by the case.  In Part II, I will
predict the manner in which the Supreme Court would decide the
case if it were to arise in the context of one of the many relatively sta-
ble areas of law.  I will describe a hypothetical unanimous opinion in
which the Court simply applies recent precedents in deciding to re-
verse the Fourth Circuit.  In Part III, however, I will explain why I
doubt that the Court will dispose of the case in such a routine man-
ner.  Laidlaw raises broad issues with respect to the allocation of
power among the branches of the federal government and between
the federal government and the States.  The Court’s recent decisions
demonstrate that many Justices perceive a need to make radical
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.  I am grateful to
the participants in the George Washington University Works in Progress Group for providing
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1. 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
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changes in these areas of law.  Laidlaw provides a vehicle through
which the Justices can, and probably will, continue their vigorous de-
bate about the permissible roles of Congress, the Executive Branch,
the federal courts, and the States.  In Part IV, I will describe the con-
flicting models of government that are competing for the support of a
majority of Justices.  I will also explore the reasons why the doctrinal
debates surrounding cases like Laidlaw have become complicated,
confused, and highly indeterminate in outcome.  Finally, in Part V, I
will discuss five major issues that the Court might choose to address
in the process of deciding Laidlaw.  Even if the Court decides Laid-
law without addressing any of those issues, it is virtually certain to
have occasion to address each of the five in one of the scores of other
cases coming up through the lower courts, where these issues have
been robustly contested.
I.  THE FACTS AND OPINIONS BELOW
Laidlaw operates a hazardous waste incinerator that discharges
wastewater into the Tyger River in South Carolina.2  Laidlaw has a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
that authorizes it to discharge wastewater containing only specific
quantities of toxic substances—including mercury—and that requires
it to monitor and report its emissions.3  Any violation of an NPDES
permit is a violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), carrying the po-
tential to subject the permit holder to a declaratory judgment, an in-
junction, and/or civil penalties.4
On April 10, 1992, Friends of the Earth sent a letter to Laidlaw,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the South Caro-
lina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) noti-
2. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 592
(D.S.C. 1997).
3. See id. at 593.
4. See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1365(a)
(1994).  Section 1365(a) states, in pertinent part, that any citizen may commence suit:
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental in-
strumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (a) an effluent standard or limitation
under this Act or (b) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation….
§ 1365(a) goes on to say:
The district courts shall have the jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in contro-
versy of the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limita-
tion, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the
case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 309(d) of this
Act.
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fying all three of its intent to file a “citizen suit” against Laidlaw in
sixty days.5  Friends of the Earth stated it planned to allege that
Laidlaw was engaged in ongoing violations of the CWA by repeatedly
violating its NPDES permit.  Such a 60-day notice letter is a statutory
prerequisite to filing a complaint under the provision of the CWA
that authorizes citizen suits.6  On June 9, 1992, the DHEC filed a
complaint against Laidlaw in a state court,7 alleging that Laidlaw was
violating its permit.  That complaint was accompanied by a proposed
consent decree in which the DHEC and Laidlaw would agreed to set-
tle the case on specified terms.8  The state court approved the consent
decree on June 10, 1992.9
Friends of the Earth filed a citizen suit against Laidlaw on June
12, 1992,10 alleging that Laidlaw was engaged in ongoing violations of
its permit, including hundreds of violations relating to mercury re-
strictions and hundreds of violations of the monitoring and reporting
requirements.11  Friends of the Earth submitted affidavits of several of
its members alleging that they were injured by Laidlaw’s violations.
The affidavits described that the members used the Tyger River
downstream of Laidlaw’s point of discharge and that the members
had curtailed their uses because of concerns about the potential ad-
verse effects of Laidlaw’s violations on human health and on fish.12
Laidlaw filed a motion to dismiss the citizen suit on grounds that
Friends of the Earth lacked standing.13  The district court denied that
motion.14
Laidlaw also filed a motion to dismiss Friends of the Earth’s citi-
zen suit on the basis that the DHEC was “diligently prosecuting”
Laidlaw for its violations of its permit.15  The CWA prohibits citizen
suits when the EPA or a state agency with jurisdiction is diligently
5. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 477
(D.S.C. 1995).
6. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1994).
7. See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 477.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 477-78.
12. See Brief of Petitioner at 6, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).
13. See id. at 6.
14. See id.
15. See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 474.
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prosecuting a party for alleged violations of the Act.16  After con-
ducting a seven-day evidentiary hearing, the district court denied
Laidlaw’s motion.17  It concluded that the DHEC was not diligently
prosecuting Laidlaw.
After conducting a hearing on the merits, the district court issued
an order in 1997 in which it found that Laidlaw had violated the mer-
cury limits in its permit 489 times, the monitoring requirements 420
times, and the reporting requirements 503 times.18  The court found
that 13 of the mercury violations, 13 of the monitoring violations, and
10 of the reporting violations occurred after Friends of the Earth had
filed its citizen suit.19  The district court denied Friends of the Earth’s
request for injunctive relief on the basis that Laidlaw had come into
substantial compliance with its permit between the time Friends of
the Earth filed its complaint and the time the district court issued its
order on the merits.20  The district court ordered Laidlaw to pay
$405,800 in civil penalties, however.21
Friends of the Earth filed an appeal in the Fourth Circuit in
which it argued that the civil penalties imposed by the district court
were inadequate.22  Laidlaw filed an appeal in which it again argued
that Friends of the Earth lacked standing and that its suit was statuto-
rily barred because the DHEC was diligently prosecuting Laidlaw.23
The Fourth Circuit did not address any of the issues raised by the par-
ties.  Instead, it reversed the district court on the basis that the case
had become moot once the district court rejected Friends of the
Earth’s request for injunctive relief and Friends of the Earth had cor-
respondingly declined to appeal that aspect of the district court’s de-
cision.24  The Fourth Circuit arrived at its mootness conclusion by ex-
plaining that one of the three constitutionally required elements for
plaintiffs’ standing had fallen away—namely, redressability.25  Be-
cause the plaintiffs were only appealing the sufficiency of the civil
16. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
17. See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 497.
18. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 600-01
(D.S.C. 1997).
19. See id. at 601.
20. See id. at 611.
21. See id. at 610.
22. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 305-06 (4th
Cir. 1998).
23. See id. at 305.
24. See id. at 306-07.
25. See id. at 306.
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penalties paid below—penalties which had been paid entirely to the
United States Treasury—the court found that a ruling on this claim
would provide no judicially cognizable redress to any arguable injury
suffered by a citizen/plaintiff as a result of Laidlaw’s violations of the
CWA.26  The Fourth Circuit referenced the Supreme Court’s 1998
holding in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,27 reit-
erating that: (1) a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a complaint
when the court cannot impose a remedy that will redress a plaintiff’s
injury; and, (2) a civil penalty paid to the U.S. cannot redress the in-
jury caused to a private citizen by a defendant’s violation of a stat-
ute.28
II.  A HYPOTHETICAL ROUTINE RESOLUTION OF LAIDLAW
The Court could dispose of the issues raised in Laidlaw in a wide
variety of ways.  Under one possibility, the Court could simply apply
the reasoning in two of its recent decisions—its 1998 decision in Steel
Company and its 1987 decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.29  If the Court were to take that ap-
proach, it could issue a relatively brief unanimous opinion in which it
reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that Friends of the Earth’s suit
was not in fact moot.
The Fourth Circuit relied on Steel Company to support its hold-
ing that Friends of the Earth’s suit was moot.30  Steel Company does
not support that holding for two reasons.  First, the Court in Steel
Company did not entertain or invoke a mootness argument.  Instead,
the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ appeal because it found that they
lacked standing.31  Traditionally, standing questions and mootness
questions have required the application of different tests.
Second, the standing-based holding in Steel Company does not
apply to a case like Laidlaw.  In Steel Company, the six-justice major-
ity began by reciting the three-part test for determining whether a
private plaintiff has Article III standing to sue a defendant for alleg-
edly violating a federal statute.  As an “irreducible constitutional
minimum,” the plaintiff must prove that: (1) he has suffered a judi-
26. See id.
27. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
28. See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07.
29. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
30. See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07.
31. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 109-10.
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cially-cognizable injury, (2) caused by the defendant’s violations, and,
(3) the injury is capable of being redressed by a court.32
In Steel Company, the majority held that the plaintiff lacked
standing because he alleged “only past infractions of [an environ-
mental statute], and not a continuing violation . . . .”33  Two of the Jus-
tices who joined in the six-justice majority opinion wrote a separate
concurring opinion in which they emphasized the importance of the
distinction between an unredressable past violation and “a continuing
or imminent violation” that would be redressable.34  Thus, while some
of the reasoning in the majority opinion in Steel Company might be
interpreted broadly to apply to any citizen suit in which the plaintiff
seeks civil penalties, the holding applies only to a plaintiff who alleges
that the defendant engaged in “wholly past” violations of an envi-
ronmental statute.  Laidlaw is easily distinguishable as a case in which
the plaintiff alleged (and proved) that the defendant was engaging in
continuing violations of an environmental statute.
While Laidlaw is easily distinguishable from Steel Company, its
resolution seems to be governed a fortiori by the Court’s 1987 deci-
sion in Gwaltney.35  In that case, the plaintiffs filed a citizen suit
against Gwaltney alleging that Gwaltney had engaged in violations of
the CWA by violating its NPDES permit.36  The plaintiffs were able to
prove only that Gwaltney had engaged in “wholly past” violations of
the CWA.37  The Court concluded that the citizen-suit provision of the
CWA was intended only to authorize citizen suits that will deter a de-
fendant from engaging in future violations of the CWA and that, con-
sequently, a citizen suit could not have such a deterrent effect when it
alleges only past violations.38
The Court went on, however, to hold that the district court had
jurisdiction to consider the complaint, even though the plaintiffs had
been unsuccessful in proving that Gwaltney was engaged in a con-
tinuous violation of the CWA, because the plaintiffs had a good faith
belief that Gwaltney was engaged in continuous violations at the time
plaintiffs filed their complaint.39  The Court held that such a good
32. See id. at 102-04.
33. Id. at 109.
34. See id. at 110.
35. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
36. See id. at 54.
37. See id. at 55-56.
38. See id. at 56-63.
39. See id. at 64-65.
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faith belief is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court.40  The Court
continued by noting that defendants like Gwaltney, who are not in
fact engaged in continuous violations of the CWA, can seek dismissal
of a citizen suit based on “principles of mootness.”41 The Court fur-
ther commented, however, that “the defendant, must demonstrate
that it is ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur’” in order to obtain an order of
dismissal based on mootness.42
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion on behalf of three Justices ex-
pressed the view that a good faith belief that a defendant is engaging
in a continuing violation of the CWA is not sufficient to confer juris-
diction on a court.43  In the view of the concurring Justices, a plaintiff
must prove a continuing violation in order to satisfy the jurisdictional
predicates applicable to a citizen suit under the CWA.44  The concur-
ring Justices emphasized, however, that a permitee remains in viola-
tion of the CWA once it has violated the CWA unless it has “put in
place remedial measures that clearly eliminate the cause of the viola-
tion.”45  The concurring Justices went on to explain the relationship
between standing and mootness:
It does not suffice to defeat subject-matter jurisdiction that the suc-
cess of the attempted remedies becomes clear months or even
weeks after the suit is filed.  Subject matter jurisdiction “depends
on the state of things at the time of the action brought;” if it existed
when the suit was brought “subsequent events” cannot “oust” the
court of jurisdiction.46
Thus, in the opinion of the concurring Justices, the outcome-
determinative question should be whether “the defendant was in a
state of compliance when this suit was filed.”47
If the Court decides simply to apply Steel Company and Gwalt-
ney, it will issue a unanimous decision in which it distinguishes Steel
Company as a case involving “wholly past violations” and applies the
reasoning of either the majority opinion or the concurring opinion in
Gwaltney as the basis to reverse the Fourth Circuit and to hold that
40. See id. at 65.
41. See id. at 66.
42. Id. at 66 (quoting United States v. Phosphate Export Ass’n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968)).
43. See id. at 67-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. See id. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. See id.
46. Id. (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)).
47. Id.
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the case is not moot.  Under the reasoning in the majority opinion in
Gwaltney, Friends of the Earth clearly had standing, and the district
court clearly had jurisdiction, because 1) Friends of the Earth had a
good faith belief that Laidlaw was engaging in a continuous violation
of the CWA at the time it filed its complaint and, 2) the case had not
become moot because the district court did not make a finding that it
was “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.”  Equivalently, under the reasoning
of the concurring opinion in Gwaltney, Friends of the Earth clearly
had standing, and the district court clearly had jurisdiction, because
the district court found that Laidlaw was engaged in a continuing
violation of the CWA at the time Friends of the Earth filed its com-
plaint.  The district court found that Laidlaw did not come into “sub-
stantial compliance” with its permit until two months after Friends of
the Earth filed its complaint48 and that Laidlaw continued to commit
sporadic violations throughout the years during which the case was
being litigated.49
The above is one possible Supreme Court resolution of the issues
raised by Laidlaw.  It is the resolution I would predict if the case had
arisen in one of many contexts in which the law is relatively stable
and predictable.  However, it is an unlikely resolution, given the ex-
traordinarily dynamic and ideologically-charged context in which
Laidlaw emerges.  Some of the Justices might write an opinion of the
type I have just described.  Other Justices would be likely to see
Laidlaw as an opportunity to further their agendas with respect to
one or more of three broad issues:  1) the meaning and effects of the
Case or Controversy clause in Article III; 2) the meaning and effects
of the Take Care clause in Article II; and/or 3) the meaning and ef-
fects of the principles of federalism implicit in the structure and his-
tory of the Constitution.
III.  THE CONTEXT IN WHICH LAIDLAW ARISES
Laidlaw strongly implicates the relationships among the three
branches of the federal government, as well as the relationships be-
tween the federal government and the states.  The Supreme Court has
made dramatic changes in both of these areas of law in recent years—
often in five-to-four decisions.50  Several Justices—perhaps a major-
48. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 611
(D.S.C. 1997).
49. See id. at 601.
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often in five-to-four decisions.50  Several Justices—perhaps a major-
ity—disagree strongly with the basic philosophies of government on
which the prevalent doctrines in these areas of law have been prem-
ised in the past.  Because of their deliberate endeavors, doctrine in
these areas has proven extraordinarily dynamic and unpredictable.
Every term of the Court brings surprising new twists.  The confusing
doctrinal debates mask a much broader dispute about competing
models of government.
The Court has issued over one hundred opinions involving
standing to obtain access to the courts over the past two decades.51
The Court increasingly uses the law of standing to define the permis-
sible relationships among the branches of government.52  Most stand-
ing disputes have been resolved by five or six-justice majorities of
ever-shifting composition.53  Some of the most important cases have
no majority opinion, thereby forcing the reader to speculate about the
nature and extent of the disagreements between the Justices who
joined in a plurality opinion and the Justices who joined in a concur-
ring opinion.54  The resulting body of law is not a model of clarity or
consistency.  The Court alters the law of standing every term.55
The basic elements of what has come to be considered the black
letter law of constitutional standing have a remarkably brief and
questionable pedigree—not to mention a constantly shifting content.
As a matter of course, the Court has begun each of its modern stand-
ing opinions with the statement that the Case or Controversy clause
of Article III requires a plaintiff to establish at a minimum:  1) injury-
in-fact, 2) caused by the defendant, and 3) redressable by a court.56
The Court has treated each element as if it were a well-settled and
long-standing interpretation of Article III.  Yet, each of these re-
quirements is relatively new.  The Court first announced the injury-
50. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress’s attempt
to regulate the presence of guns in areas surrounding public schools exceeds the scope of its
powers under the Commerce Clause).  See also infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
51. See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
ch. 16 (3d ed. 1994 & 1999 Supplement).
52. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Im-
posed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1186-88 (1993).
53. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1750-58
(1999).
54. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 52, at 1171-88 (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
55. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 1750-58.
56. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102-05.
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in-fact requirement in 1970,57 and it first announced the causation and
redressability requirements in 1973.58  Each requirement also enjoys
little, if any, support in text, history, or pre-1970 precedents.  Numer-
ous scholars have searched in vain for evidence that the Case or Con-
troversy clause actually requires any of the three elements the Court
now necessitates.59
More recently, the Court has redefined each of the three re-
quirements in ways that give them much more powerful effects in
some contexts, and it has applied them in ways that work significant
reallocations of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches.  Thus, for instance, in 1992 the Court first relied on Article
III reasoning as the basis to hold that federal courts lack jurisdiction
to consider particular statutorily-authorized causes of action,60 and the
Court’s 1998 decision in Steel Company was the first case in which the
Court relied on lack of redressability as the sole basis to reject juris-
diction to consider a statutorily-authorized cause of action.61  In each
of these recent cases, the majority or plurality decision resulted in a
reduction of power for both the judicial and legislative branches and a
centralizing of power in the executive branch.62
The Court regularly changes the vital substance of each of the
three elements of the Article III standing test.63  The nature of the in-
jury, causal relationship, and redressability requirements varies both
over time and depending on the litigation context in which the re-
quirements are implicated.64  Thus, for instance, politically conserva-
tive Justices have tended to erect powerful barriers to standing for
environmentalists, prisoners, and labor unions, but to be far more ac-
commodating to banks, trade associations, and landowners.65  The
more politically liberal Justices have exhibited the opposite tenden-
57. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
58. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions; Is it a Constitutional Re-
quirement? 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Review: Public Actions,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor
of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
60. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
61. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
62. See Pierce, supra note 52, at 1186-88.
63. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 1750-58.
64. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 51, at §§16.4 and 16.5.
65. See id. at ch. 16; Pierce, supra note 53, at 1750-58.  See also John D. Echeverria & Jon
T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion of Citizen “Standing” to Sue and Enforce Environ-
mental Law at 6-7 (Envtl. Policy Project, Georgetown University Law Ctr., June 1999).
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cies.  Lower court judges mirror these tendencies, granting broad ac-
cess to those whose interests they embrace and limiting access to
those whose interests they do not share.  Thus, for instance, judges
who were appointed by Democrat Presidents vote to grant standing
to environmental plaintiffs four times as frequently as judges who
were appointed by Republican Presidents.66
Laidlaw also raises an important federalism question—in what
circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for a federal judge to evaluate
the actions of a state agency and to conclude that it is not “diligently
prosecuting” an enforcement action?  Federalism may be the only
major area of law that is even more volatile and unpredictable than
standing at present.  Since the Court’s surprising 1995 decision in
United States v. Lopez,67 the Court has decided several more cases in-
volving the relationships between the federal government and the S-
tates.68  In each case, a five-justice majority pronounced new
federalism precedent by curtailing the powers of the federal govern-
ment in particular arenas and correspondingly increasing the powers
of the States in those realms.  In its most recent federalism decision—
the 1999 decision in Alden v. Maine—the Court based its holding not
on any provision of the Constitution but on the “structure” and “his-
tory” of the Constitution.69  Now that the Court has recognized a free-
standing source of States’ rights not linked to any constitutional text,
it becomes impossible to predict the scope of States’ rights that the
Court will deem “implicit” in the Constitution.
The Justices have been engaged in a continuous, robust debate
about the constitutionally permissible relationships among the
branches of the federal government since 199270 and in a continuous,
robust debate about the constitutionally permissible relationships be-
tween the federal government and the States since 1995.71  Laidlaw
raises issues that are central to both of those debates.  The Justices
who are trying to decrease the power of the judicial and legislative
branches by centralizing power in the executive branch and those
trying to decrease the power of the federal government vis a vis the
66. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 1758-63.
67. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
68. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
69. See 527 U.S. at 724.
70. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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States are likely to see Laidlaw as yet another vehicle to further one
or both of those agendas.
The federalism debate is relatively easy to follow, but the debate
concerning the permissible allocation of power among the branches
of the federal government has become confused and difficult to track.
The source of the confusion is apparent.  Congress has been at-
tempting through recent legislation to implement a model of govern-
ment that some of the Justices would accept as constitutionally-
permissible.  Troublesome is the fact that other Justices—perhaps a
majority—would and do reject that model as allowable under the
Constitution.  The participants in this debate about competing models
of government frame their arguments with reference to the law of
standing—a cluster of legal doctrines that have only a tangential rela-
tionship to the fundamental issues that divide them.
IV.  COMPETING MODELS OF GOVERNMENT
The Fourth Circuit decided Laidlaw on the basis of mootness.72
Mootness is closely related to standing.  Both are rooted in the Case
or Controversy clause of Article III.73  The Supreme Court resolves
constitutional standing cases by analyzing injury, causation, and re-
dressability.74 When Congress enacted the statutory provision under
which Friends of the Earth sued Laidlaw, it also had an eye to the ju-
dicial concepts of injury, causation, and redressability.  Congress’
conception of those three issues differed dramatically from the ways
in which the Court thinks about those issues, however (albeit that the
Court’s thoughts are not always entirely consistent over time).  The
Court requires the plaintiff to establish injury, causation, and redress-
ability on a “particularized” basis,75 while Congress was attempting to
address those issues on a more generalized basis.
Friends of the Earth sued Laidlaw pursuant to the citizen suit
provision of the CWA.76  Congress has included similar provisions in
all major federal environmental statutes,77 as well as in the False
72. See 149 F.3d at 306-07.
73. See United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980).
74. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-05 (1998).
75. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883, 899 (1990).
76. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
77. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6972, 9659 (1994).  Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994); but see
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Claims Act (FCA).78  Congress’s goal in each case was to encourage
private citizens to assist agencies in enforcing public laws.  Each of
the statutes provides one form of incentive to private parties—the
private party plaintiff can recover its lawyer’s fees from the defendant
if it prevails.79  The analogous provision of FCA includes an additional
incentive—the private plaintiff is awarded a share of the civil penal-
ties assessed against the defendant.80
In each case, Congress was trying to address an “injury” of sorts.
In the case of the CWA, for instance, Congress was trying to deter
emitters of pollution from discharging pollutants that will harm the
public in a variety of ways—for example, by making rivers unhealthy
for swimming, boating, or fishing.  Congress assigned the EPA and
state agencies the task of determining the causal relationships be-
tween emissions of pollutants and various types of injuries to the gen-
eral public.  In many cases, the EPA or a state water quality agency is
required to set the permissible levels of emissions of pollutants from a
particular source at levels which, when combined with emissions from
all other sources, will avoid injuries of various types to the parts of the
river downstream of each source.81  Neither Congress nor the permit-
ting agencies care about what the Supreme Court refers to as a “par-
ticularized” demonstration that specific emissions from a specific
source cause specific harm to specific individuals.  Their focus is on
the general relationships between emissions of pollutants and water
bodies that are used by the general public.  Thus, for instance, a per-
mitting agency, acting on instructions from Congress, limits emissions
of mercury from a specific source based on its belief that emissions
above that level, when combined with emissions from many other
sources, are likely to cause injuries of some type to at least some un-
known people who use the waters downstream of the point of dis-
charge.  Neither Congress nor the agencies know, or care about, the
particularized relationships—for example, whether emissions of mer-
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1994 & Supp. V
1999) (has no citizen-suit provision).
78. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1994).
79. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); (“The court, in issuing any final order . . . may award
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or
substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”).
80. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).  This type of “incentivized” citizen suit is known as a qui
tam action.  See also infra Part V.D (discussing the history and characteristics of qui tam ac-
tions).
81. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76
WASH. U.  L.Q. 1307, 1333-35 (1998).
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cury from a particular source in excess of a particular level will cause
particular injuries to particular, identifiable persons.
Yet, in the context of citizen suits, some on the Court reject as
constitutionally impermissible the public law model that was the basis
for the citizen-suit provision that Congress included in the CWA and
the generalized determinations of injury and causation that were the
basis for the decisions of permitting agencies.  Those Justices apply
instead a private law model that requires the plaintiff to prove that he
will suffer a particular injury as a result of a particular emission from
a particular source.82  As a result, judicial decisions in this area often
address the critical issues of injury and causation in ways that are
completely inconsistent with the ways in which Congress and regula-
tory agencies address those issues.
The debates between those who accept the public law model and
those who reject that model become even more confused in the con-
text of redressability.  Congress was attempting to create remedies
that would “redress” injuries caused by water pollution when it in-
cluded a citizen-suit provision in the CWA.  Consistent with the pub-
lic law model it was applying, Congress included remedies that it felt
would redress injuries to the general public.  Thus, for instance, Con-
gress authorized private citizens to sue firms that violate the CWA in
order to supplement scarce public enforcement resources and to ren-
der more effective the provisions of the CWA that are designed to
avoid injuries to the public.  It instructed courts to impose civil penal-
ties against firms violating the CWA at the behest of private citizens
as a means of deterring firms from harming the public.
Congress was attempting to create a remedy that would further
its goal of general deterrence.  The congressional reasoning was sim-
ple and compelling.  If polluters have cause to fear that a court might
impose penalties on them for violating the CWA at any time at the
behest of any citizen who detects a violation and files a citizen suit,
they will be dissuaded from violating the CWA.  Until the Supreme
Court’s decision in Steel Company, the Fourth Circuit had accepted
and applied that reasoning in resolving redressability disputes.83
Some Justices do indeed accept and apply the rationale of re-
dressability in the public law model, but others reject it as constitu-
82. See Pierce, supra note 52, at 1174-77 (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992)).
83. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988).  The
Fourth Circuit panel that decided Laidlaw concluded that Steel Company overruled Simkins.
See 149 F.3d 303, 306 n.4.
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tionally impermissible.84  To them, the general deterrent effect of a
remedy available to a private citizen is irrelevant in deciding whether
a court may consider a citizen’s complaint.  To the Justices who reject
the public law model, a remedy counts as redress for an injury only if
it specifically deters a specific firm from acting in a manner that will
injure the plaintiff.85  The briefs and oral argument in Laidlaw are
laced with debates about the deterrent effects of civil penalties.
Those debates are often confusing, and sometimes incoherent, be-
cause some participants are referring to general deterrence while oth-
ers are referring to specific deterrence.
It is easy to see how the potential imposition of civil penalties
serves as a powerful general deterrent to all firms that are tempted to
violate the CWA.  It is much more difficult—perhaps impossible—to
argue persuasively that civil penalties deter a specific firm from vio-
lating the CWA.  Once penalties are imposed, based necessarily on
past violations, they may not deter the firm from violating the CWA.
Their only effects are to punish that firm for its past behavior, and to
deter all firms from engaging in similar behavior in the future.  Yet,
some Justices are convinced that only specific deterrence can satisfy
the redressability requirement of Article III.
The confused debate about what suffices to satisfy the three ele-
ments of constitutional standing—injury, causation, and redressabil-
ity—tends to mask the contours of the real debate.  Beneath the con-
fusing doctrinal debate lies a much more important philosophical
debate.  By including citizen-suit provisions in public law statutes,
Congress adopted a model of government in which citizens can be,
and are, empowered to use the courts to enforce public laws.  At least
four scholarly studies have attempted to prove that the Framers of
the Constitution embraced that model,86 but some Justices hold the
conviction that the Framers rejected that model.
Under the leadership of Justice Scalia, a group of Justices
numbering somewhere between four and six has taken the position
that only the President can enforce a public law; a private citizen can
only vindicate his own private rights.87  The Court’s recent environ-
84. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 106-07 (“Justice Stevens thinks it is enough . . . that the pun-
ishment will deter the risk of future harm . . . . Obviously, such a principle would make the re-
dressability requirement vanish.”).
85. See id. at 106-09.
86. See supra note 59 (collecting sources).
87. Four Justices clearly embraced this view in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, but it is not
at all clear that the two concurring Justices agreed.  See Pierce, supra note 52, at 1171-88.
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mental standing opinions—each of which was authored by Justice
Scalia—contain several suggestions to this effect.88  Justice (then-
judge) Scalia described his views most clearly and comprehensively,
however, in a 1983 article in Suffolk Law Review.89  In that article, he
explained in detail the bases for his belief that only the executive
branch can enforce a public law.  So far, Justice Scalia has convinced
a majority of his colleagues to go about halfway toward adopting his
view of the Constitution.  I have no doubt that he will continue to
press for further changes in doctrine until the Court has embraced his
entire theory.  Laidlaw provides him another opportunity to further
that goal.  Laidlaw also provides Justice Scalia an opportunity to ad-
vance his strong theory of States’ rights.  Justice Scalia is unlikely to
resist all of those openings.  The truly interesting questions are how
he will attempt to change the law in Laidlaw and whether he will be
successful in doing so.
V.  ISSUES THE COURT MIGHT ADDRESS IN LAIDLAW
I will now discuss five issues raised by Laidlaw that could be the
basis for a decision in which the Court makes a major change in law.
Those issues are:  1) mootness, 2) redressability, 3) injury and causa-
tion, 4) the meaning of the “Take Care” clause, and 5) the federalism
concern raised by the district court’s interpretation of “diligent prose-
cution.”  The Court could use Laidlaw as a vehicle to debate any of
those issues.  Even if the Court chooses not to address any of those
issues in deciding Laidlaw, each is worthy of discussion, because each
is already the subject of lively debate in the circuit courts.  Thus, it is
virtually certain that the Court will have occasion to address each in
the near future.
A. Mootness
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to impose penalties on Laidlaw at the behest of Friends of the Earth
because the case became moot once the district court denied the
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief and the plaintiff declined to
take its appeal.90  The Supreme Court could uphold the Fourth Circuit
on mootness grounds, but only if it changes the law of mootness.  The
88. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105-06; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
89. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881 (1983).
90. See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d 303, 306-307 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Fourth Circuit relied on lack of redressability as the basis for its
mootness holding.91  Redressability is a requirement for standing, but
the Court has never held that lack of redressability is a sufficient basis
to dismiss a case as moot.  Instead, the Court has held that a case is
moot only if the defendant demonstrates that “it is absolutely clear
that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonabley be ex-
pected to recur.”92  The district court made no such finding.  In fact,
Laidlaw continued to violate the CWA sporadically during the course
of the proceedings before the district court.93  Thus, the Supreme
Court could uphold the Fourth Circuit on mootness grounds only by
working a significant change in the standard for mootness.
Some Justices might welcome the opportunity to change moot-
ness law.  Like standing, mootness is based on the Case or Contro-
versy Clause of Article III.  The Court has referred to mootness as
“the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.”94  The Court has made
major changes in standing law in the last decade,95 but it has not made
analogous changes in mootness law.  The resulting legal regime is a
bit strange.  It is hard to obtain standing, but it is easy to avoid moot-
ness.  This result is particularly strange since the Court has said that a
plaintiff must be able to establish standing at any stage of a case to
avoid dismissal based on lack of standing.96  Thus, in theory, a case
that is not “moot,” under the principles of mootness doctrine, can yet
be dismissed on the basis that the plaintiff no longer has standing be-
cause one of the three elements of standing doctrine has ceased to
exist.  The Justices who have transformed the law of standing during
the last decade might see Laidlaw as a welcome opportunity to
change the law of mootness to create a better fit with the new law of
standing.
I hope that the Court does not use Laidlaw as a vehicle to change
the law of mootness.  There are good reasons to retain a law of moot-
ness that makes it hard for a defendant to obtain a dismissal based on
mootness grounds.  This is an issue that Friends of the Earth argued
91. See id. at 306-07.  It is also possible that the Court could uphold the Fourth Circuit on
mootness grounds on the basis of a change of facts since the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion.
Laidlaw has ceased all operations at the facility that is the subject of the dispute.  See Brief of
Respondent at 24, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).
92. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66 (1987).
93. See Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. 588, 601 (D.S.C. 1997).
94. See United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980).
95. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 51, at ch. 16.
96. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
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particularly effectively in its brief.  Since I cannot improve on that ar-
gument, I will quote it:
Standing serves a gatekeeping function.  It serves to keep cases that
are not justiciable out of the courthouse.  Mootness, on the other
hand, does not serve the same gatekeeping function.  By the time
mootness is an issue, the case has been brought and litigated, often
for years.  This Court’s holdings making it extremely difficult for a
case to be dismissed as moot serve to protect the rights and re-
sources of the parties and the courts.
Moreover, the wasting of time and resources could become a vi-
cious circle if a case were easily dismissed due to the voluntary ces-
sation of the illegal conduct.  In such circumstances, defendants
would be free to resume illegal conduct, cease such conduct during
suit to avoid the consequences of the suit, resume the illegal con-
duct when the case was dismissed as moot, and so on.97
As the United States pointed out in its amicus brief,98 the change
in mootness law urged by Laidlaw would give every defendant a pow-
erful incentive to prolong the litigation until it is finally in compliance
or, conversely, to delay compliance until the litigation is about to con-
clude.  It also would deter private parties from bringing enforcement
actions.  The defendant could moot any case by coming into compli-
ance just before a court issues a decision against the defendant.  That,
in turn, would preclude the plaintiff from recovering its litigation
costs as a prevailing party.
Of course, even if the Court uses Laidlaw as a vehicle to make
mootness law identical to standing law, it could not uphold the Fourth
Circuit’s mootness holding without changing the law of standing to
some extent.  Some Justices would welcome the opportunity to do
that as well.  Alterations to standing doctrine could take place in one
of three ways: 1) a change in the redressability requirement; 2) a
change in the injury and/or causation requirements; or, 3) a change in
interpretation of the “Take Care” clause in Article II.
B. Redressability
The Fourth Circuit based its mootness holding on the Court’s
discussion of redressability in Steel Company.99  Laidlaw is easily dis-
tinguishable from Steel Company, but the Court certainly could use
97. Brief of Petitioner at 23-24, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167 (2000) (No. 98-822).
98. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States in Support of Petitioners at 15-19, Laid-
law, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).
99. See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07 (discussing Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-05).
I - ISSUES RAISED BY FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V. LAIDLAW - PIERCE.DOC 04/25/01  9:37 AM
Spring 2001] ISSUES RAISED BY LAIDLAW:  ACCESS TO THE COURTS 225
Laidlaw as a conduit to increase the stringency of the redressability
requirement in citizen-suit cases.  The Steel Company majority distin-
guished between suits alleging “wholly past” violations and suits al-
leging continuing violations.  It concluded that wholly past violations
are not redressable, while continuing violations are.100
The Steel Company majority distinguished among remedies in
discussing redressability, however.  It stated that:  “[i]f respondent
had alleged a continuing violation, the injunctive relief requested
would remedy that alleged harm.”101  The Steel Company majority
suggested that civil penalties can never redress a private plaintiff’s
injury because they are not payable to the plaintiff.102  It also sug-
gested that the general deterrent effect of civil penalties is constitu-
tionally inadequate to redress a private plaintiff’s injury.  Moreover,
the majority referred to, and rejected, the argument of Justice Stevens
that civil penalties could redress a private plaintiff’s injury because
they “deter the risk of future harm.”103
The Fourth Circuit relied on these passages from Steel Company
to support its holding that Friends of the Earth could not maintain its
action for civil penalties once the district court denied its request for
injunctive relief and Friends of the Earth declined to appeal that deci-
sion.104  Laidlaw devoted much of its brief to its argument that civil
penalties can never redress a private plaintiff’s injury.  If a majority of
the Court continues to reject the public law model on which citizen
suits are premised—and the general deterrence rationale that logi-
cally accompanies the public law model—the Court could easily em-
brace Laidlaw’s argument.  In its briefs and at oral argument, Friends
of the Earth experienced great difficulty attempting to explain how a
civil penalty imposed against a particular firm that is no longer vio-
lating the statute deters that firm from committing future violations.105
I hope the Court rejects Laidlaw’s redressability argument, not be-
cause I believe that civil penalties further the goal of specific deter-
rence, but because I believe it is enough that they further the goal of
100. See 523 U.S. 83, 108-09 (1998).
101. Id. at 108.
102. See id. at 106-09.
103. See id. at 107.
104. See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 106-07.
105. See Brief of Petitioners at 24-42, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 3-13, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).  Also see the confusing debate between
Counsel for the United States and several Justices on the issue of whether a penalty imposed
against a firm that is now in compliance can have a deterrent effect on that firm.  See id. at 13-
21.
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general deterrence.  My conception is based on my acceptance of the
public law model as constitutionally permissible—an issue that I have
addressed at length elsewhere.106  However it is not clear that a ma-
jority of Justices agree with that proposition.
If the Court renders the redressability requirement more de-
manding by holding that civil penalties can never redress a private
plaintiff’s injury, it will force environmental plaintiffs to change their
litigation tactics in citizen-suit cases.  They will place much greater
emphasis on obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief from district
courts.  Ironically, environmental plaintiffs’ ability to succeed in pur-
suing this approach would be greatly enhanced by a hypothetical de-
cision of the Court holding that civil penalties are unavailable to pri-
vate plaintiffs.  Longstanding common law principles provide that
equitable remedies are available only when adequate remedies at law
are unavailable.107  Because the Court’s hypothetical holding would
render unavailable the legal remedy of civil penalties, it is easy to
predict that many environmental plaintiffs would successfully
circumvent a dismissal grounded in the constitutional inadequacy of
civil penalties by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief instead.
The Court could render those efforts at circumvention far more
difficult, however, by applying, and potentially expanding, its contro-
versial 1983 holding in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.108  In Lyons, a
five-justice majority held that a victim of an illegal police chokehold
lacked standing to seek equitable relief because he was unable to
prove that he personally was likely to be the victim of an illegal
chokehold in the future, and thus, he could not obtain appropriate
redress from a court by seeking a mere injunction against future ac-
tions.109  Thus, the Court could interpret Lyons to deny standing to an
environmental plaintiff to seek even an equitable remedy unless he
can prove that he personally is likely to be a victim of the defendant’s
illegal pollution in the future.  Environmental plaintiffs might experi-
ence great difficulty proving such a future likelihood of personal in-
jury, depending on how the Court applies the injury and causation re-
quirements in environmental standing cases.  I will address that issue
in the next section.
106. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 53, at 1763-81; DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 51, at §§ 16.11,
18.5; Pierce, supra note 52, at 1188-1201.
107. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312-14 (1982).
108. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
109. See id. at 104-05.
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This potential application of Lyons to environmental plaintiffs
highlights an odd feature of the remedy-based reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit in Laidlaw.  In Lyons, the majority held that the plain-
tiff lacked standing to seek an equitable remedy in part because he
had access to the legal remedy of damages.110  Yet, in Laidlaw, the
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek the le-
gal remedy of civil penalties because they were no longer seeking an
equitable remedy.111  Will a majority of Justices apply this circular rea-
soning to support a holding that environmental plaintiffs lack stand-
ing to seek any statutorily-authorized remedy?  The answer to that
question, like all others in this area of law, probably depends on
whether a majority of Justices accept or reject the permissibility of the
public law model on which citizen-suit provisions are based.  By my
count, three Justices accept that model, four reject it, and two are still
undecided.112
C. Injury and Causation
The Fourth Circuit “assume[d] without deciding that Plaintiffs
had standing to initiate this action and have proven a continuous in-
jury in fact.”113  The Court is not bound by that assumption, however.
It could use Laidlaw as a vehicle to revisit, and to revise, the require-
ments for injury and causation in environmental cases.  The district
court made a finding that the Court could exploit as the basis for a
holding that the plaintiffs did not prove that defendant’s conduct
caused them injury in fact.
At an early stage in the proceeding, the district judge held that
Friends of the Earth had standing.114  He based that holding on a com-
bination of four types of evidence:  1) affidavits of members stating
that their uses of the Tyger River downstream of Laidlaw’s discharges
were adversely affected in various ways by Laidlaw’s illegal dis-
charges of mercury; 2) scientific studies that demonstrated that mer-
cury is extremely toxic in fish and humans; 3) evidence that Laidlaw
had exceeded its permissible emissions of mercury by as much as thir-
teen-fold on hundreds of occasions; and 4) evidence of fish kills in the
110. See id. at 108-11.
111. See 149 F.3d at 306.
112. I base my beliefs primarily on the views expressed in the several opinions in Lujan, 504
U.S. 555, and Steel Company, 523 U.S. 83.
113. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306 n.3.
114. He announced that holding orally.  See Brief of Petitioner at 6, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167
(No. 98-822).
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Tyger River downstream of Laidlaw.  At the conclusion of the trial of
the merits of the case, however, the judge found that “there has been
no showing of any significant harm to the environment in this case.”115
He based that finding on several recently-completed studies con-
ducted both by Laidlaw and by the DHEC,116 indicating no harm to
fish or to water quality as a result of Laidlaw’s violations.  The Court
could choose to rely on this finding as the basis for a holding that
Friends of the Earth lacked standing to sue Laidlaw because it did not
prove that Laidlaw’s conduct caused any judicially cognizable injury
to the plaintiffs.
If the Court does not address this issue in Laidlaw, it almost cer-
tainly will soon address it in the context of one of the many other
cases that raise this issue.  For instance, a divided panel of the Third
Circuit held that environmental plaintiffs lacked standing on this basis
in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc.,117 as did a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit in Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.118
Justices who reject as constitutionally impermissible the public
law model on which citizen suits are premised might find a holding
based on injury and causation attractive.  These two related concepts
are infinitely malleable.  The Court could easily define them in a
manner that creates a nearly insurmountable obstacle to any envi-
ronmental plaintiff.  The Court could hold that a plaintiff must prove
that he has suffered a specific injury attributable to a specific illegal
act committed by the defendant.  In the vast majority of cases, an en-
vironmental plaintiff could never satisfy such a demanding require-
ment.  Injuries attributable to water pollution, for instance, are
caused by the complicated interactions of hundreds of emissions of
pollutants into water bodies.  In the typical case, no one can isolate
the adverse effects of a single illegal discharge on an identifiable indi-
vidual.
I have commented on this dilemma at considerable length else-
where.119  I oppose creation of such demanding tests of injury and cau-
sation in environmental standing cases because:  1) the Court does
not apply them in other types of standing cases,120 2) courts lack the
115. 956 F. Supp. 588, 600 (D.S.C. 1997).
116. See id. at 600, 602-03.
117. 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
118. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc granted, August 3, 1999.
119. See Pierce, supra note 81, at 1332-39.
120. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 1777-81.
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institutional competence to make such determinations,121 3) courts
would have to devote substantial scarce resources to potentially long
trials to resolve intractable injury and causation disputes,122 and 4) in
many cases, an agency has already resolved the injury and causation
issues in the process of issuing a permit.123  A Justice would not likely
find my objections persuasive, however, if he or she believes that all
citizen suits are constitutionally impermissible.
D. The Take Care Clause
Justice Scalia believes that the Constitution permits only the
executive branch to enforce a public law.  He has expressed and ex-
plained this view both in his 1988 dissenting opinion in Morrison v.
Olson124 and in his 1983 article in Suffolk Law Review.125  It is easier
and more logical to support this view with reference to the Take Care
clause in Article II than with reference to the Case or Controversy
clause in Article III.  The Take Care clause provides that the Presi-
dent “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”  For rea-
sons that Justice Scalia articulated most fully in his Suffolk article, he
interprets the Take Care clause to command that only the President
has the power to execute the laws.
Justice Scalia’s views were considered idiosyncratic when he first
announced them in 1983.  Moreover, those views were rejected by a
seven-justice majority in the Court’s 1988 decision in Morrison v. Ol-
son.126  In 1992, however, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion on behalf of
a four-justice plurality in which he relied in part on the Take Care
clause to support a holding that an environmental plaintiff lacked
standing.127  Moreover, subsequent events may have eroded support
for the reasoning and holding of the majority in Morrison v. Olson
and may have persuaded some Justices to accept instead the views
expressed in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.  Many commentators
have expressed the view that the Starr-Lewinsky impeachment deba-
cle and the subsequent refusal of Congress to extend the life of the in-
stitution of the independent counsel have vindicated Justice Scalia’s
121. See Pierce, supra note 81, at 1333-37.
122. See id. at 1337-39.
123. See id. at 1333-35.
124. 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. See Scalia, supra note 89.
126. 487 U.S. 654.
127. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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view that such an executively unaccountable law enforcement institu-
tion is unconstitutional.128
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Take Care clause to sup-
port its holding that qui tam actions are unconstitutional.129  Consis-
tent with Justice Scalia’s views, the Fifth Circuit held that only the At-
torney General or someone subject to her plenary control can enforce
a federal public law.  The Supreme Court has agreed to address that
issue in the context of another case on its docket for the 1999-2000
Term.130
Even if the Court upholds the validity of qui tam actions, it might
still rely on the Take Care clause as the basis to hold that the citizen
suits authorized by federal environmental statutes are unconstitu-
tional.  At the oral argument in Laidlaw, Justice Scalia engaged in a
colloquy with Counsel for Laidlaw on this issue.131  Justice Scalia first
noted that the Court has never decided whether qui tam actions are
constitutional.  He then asked counsel for Laidlaw if this case
amounted to “qui tam squared.”  Counsel responded:  “I’ll agree with
that, although I’m not sure I understand it.”132
Justice Scalia’s reference was to two factors that could form the
basis for reasoning in a pair of opinions that upholds the validity of
qui tam actions, and yet find citizen suits under environmental laws
unconstitutional.  Qui tam actions have two characteristics that are
not shared by citizen suits brought under environmental statutes.
First, qui tam actions have a long and distinguished pedigree.  They
antedated the Constitution both in England and in the colonies, and
they were authorized in twenty-three statutes that were enacted by
the first four Congresses.133  Second, a qui tam relator (the private ini-
tiator of the action) is entitled to thirty per cent of the damages he re-
covers on behalf of the government.134  Consequently, a qui tam rela-
128. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, A Kiss of Death for Independent Counsels, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 1998, at A21; Jeff Rosen, Kenneth Starr, Trapped, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, §6 (Maga-
zine), at 42.
129. See Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999).  Qui tam actions
are defined supra note 80 and accompanying text.
130. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, U.S. No.
98-1828, argued Nov. 29, 1999. [Editor’s note: the citation to the now decided case is 120 S. Ct.
1858 (2000)].
131. See Transcript of Oral  Argument at 23, Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).
132. Id.
133. See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341
(1989).
134. For a familiar example under the federal law, see the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3730(d)(2) (1994).
I - ISSUES RAISED BY FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V. LAIDLAW - PIERCE.DOC 04/25/01  9:37 AM
Spring 2001] ISSUES RAISED BY LAIDLAW:  ACCESS TO THE COURTS 231
tor always has a clear personal stake in the outcome of a case.  He is
“injured” by an unfavorable disposition of his complaint, in the sense
that he is deprived of a statutorily-created right to receive a large sum
of money.  Thus, without striking down bounty-based suits as such,
Justice Scalia could hold that citizen-suit provisions in environmental
statutes are unconstitutional because the plaintiff receives no bounty
and, hence, has no stake in the outcome of the case.
I disagree with Justice Scalia’s expansive interpretation of the
Take Care clause for reasons I have set forth at length elsewhere.135
Justice Scalia’s interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the
clause, historical practice, and the Court’s past interpretations of the
clause.136  There is no doubt, however, that Justice Scalia holds his
views with conviction and that he will continue to try to persuade his
colleagues to adopt his views.  The Court will address the relationship
between the Take Care Clause and environmental citizen suits at
some point—perhaps in its opinion in Laidlaw.
E. Federalism and “Diligent Prosecution”
The Court might use Laidlaw as a vehicle to address the relation-
ship between the federal government and the States, rather than the
relationships among the branches of the federal government.  Begin-
ning in 1995, a five-justice majority has been aggressively redefining
the permissible relationships between the federal government and the
States.137  Each opinion has moved the boundary significantly toward
the interests of the States.  Some of the holdings are based on ques-
tionable reasoning and have little, if any, basis in the language of the
Constitution.138
Laidlaw raises a federalism issue that the Court might see as an
attractive alternative basis for upholding the Fourth Circuit.  Like all
citizen-suit provisions, the citizen-suit provision in the CWA author-
izes a citizen suit only if the EPA or the state with jurisdiction is not
“diligently prosecuting” the defendant.139  The DHEC was prosecuting
Laidlaw at the time Friends of the Earth filed its suit, but the district
135. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Seperation of Powers, and the Structure of
Government, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
136. See id.
137. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
138. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity
exists not because of any language in the Constitution but because of its “structure” and “his-
tory”).
139. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(B).
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court concluded that the DHEC was not diligently prosecuting.140  The
Fourth Circuit did not address this issue, and Laidlaw addressed it
only in passing in its brief.  The State of South Carolina filed an ami-
cus brief, however, in which it urged the Court to uphold the Fourth
Circuit on the alternative ground that the district court erred in con-
cluding that the DHEC was not diligently prosecuting Laidlaw.
South Carolina did an admirable job of developing its argument.
South Carolina’s contention may even appeal to Justices who are not
among the five Justices who have been making revolutionary changes
in the law of federalism.
The district judge based his conclusion on a combination of pro-
cedural and substantive characteristics of the DHEC’s enforcement
action.  Procedurally, the DHEC’s action evinced symptoms of collu-
sion.  The DHEC filed its complaint against Laidlaw one day before
the expiration of the mandatory 60-day waiting period after a citizen
notifies a state agency of its intent to sue.141  The DHEC had no inten-
tion to sue Laidlaw until Laidlaw itself insisted that it do so.142  Even
then, the DHEC agreed to file a complaint against Laidlaw only if
Laidlaw prepared the actual complaint, filed the complaint on the
DHEC’s behalf, and paid the DHEC’s filing fee.143  Thus, in a very
real sense, Laidlaw sued itself.
Substantively, the DHEC imposed a penalty on Laidlaw that was
so low that Laidlaw still realized a substantial net economic benefit as
a result of its decision not to comply with its permit.144  The EPA urges
state jurisdictional agencies to impose penalties that are high enough
to preclude a violator from obtaining economic benefits as a result of
its violations of its permit.145  The district court concluded that the
minimum penalty required to have that effect on Laidlaw was
$405,800, rather than the $100,000 penalty the DHEC had imposed.146
The DHEC’s actions were not quite as suspicious and inexplica-
ble as the above recounting would seem to suggest, however.  The
DHEC and Laidlaw were engaged in protracted debates, negotia-
tions, and administrative hearings about its mercury emissions limit
both before and during Laidlaw’s litigation with Friends of the
140. See 890 F. Supp. 470, 497 (D.S.C. 1995).
141. See id. at 477.
142. See id. at 478.
143. See id. at 479.
144. See id. at 480-84.
145. See id. at 492-94.
146. See 956 F. Supp. 588, 610 (D.S.C. 1997).
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Earth.147  Laidlaw maintained that the DHEC had erroneously set an
unjustifiably low limit on its mercury emissions.  An Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately resolved that dispute in Laidlaw’s fa-
vor.148  Apparently, the DHEC had made some combination of inter-
pretive errors and calculation errors that resulted in a decision to im-
pose an unduly low mercury emissions limit.149  The mercury emissions
limit in Laidlaw’s permit was lower than any other mercury emissions
limit in the country and less than one percent of the level permitted
by the EPA.150  Compliance with that limit would create a discharge
stream easily in compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act criteria
applicable to potable water.151  This provides some elucidation con-
cerning the district court’s finding that Laidlaw’s violations had no
adverse effects on the environment.
The DHEC ultimately accepted the ALJ’s decision and agreed to
increase Laidlaw’s permissible level of mercury emissions.152
Throughout the period in which Laidlaw and the DHEC were at-
tempting to resolve that dispute, Laidlaw was also working with the
DHEC staff in an effort to reduce its mercury emissions to maintain
strict compliance with the atypically low limit in its permit.153  Laidlaw
devoted significant resources to that effort and implemented several
different control technologies before it found a combination that
worked.154
Thus, when the DHEC filed its complaint and proposed consent
decree, it knew both that Laidlaw’s violations may well have been
caused in part by the unduly low mercury emissions limit the DHEC
had imposed on Laidlaw and that Laidlaw had been expending con-
siderable resources in its continuing attempts to comply with that
limit.  Given the totality of the circumstances, the DHEC’s otherwise
suspicious series of actions in the enforcement proceeding against
Laidlaw becomes understandable.
The district court’s approach in applying the diligent prosecution
standard seems unduly intrusive and disrespectful of South Carolina’s
exercise of discretionary judgment in performing a regulatory func-
147. See id. at 596.
148. See id. at 597.
149. See id.
150. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of South Carolina in Support of Respondent at 3,
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (No. 98-822).
151. See id.
152. See 956 F. Supp. at 597.
153. See id. at 598-99.
154. See id.
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tion that Congress and the EPA have assigned to South Carolina.
Even in the context of federal court review of federal agency deci-
sions, the Supreme Court has held that an agency’s enforcement deci-
sions are presumptively committed to the unreviewable discretion of
the agency155 unless the organic statute that is the basis for the en-
forcement decision specifically calls for judicial review. 156  That pre-
sumption of unreviewability is based on the Court’s recognition that
exercises of enforcement discretion are extremely complicated and
necessarily depend on consideration of many criteria that are
uniquely accessible to the agency.157  The complicated context in
which the DHEC acted against Laidlaw illustrates the impropriety of
judicial intrusion on agency exercises of enforcement discretion.
The presumption of unreviewability of exercises of enforcement
discretion can only be rebutted by a statutory provision that couples
mandatory language with a justiciable standard.158  It is not at all clear
that “diligent prosecution” would qualify as a justiciable standard for
the purposes of authorizing a federal court to review a federal
agency’s exercise of its enforcement discretion.  It follows a fortiori
that such a standard would be inadequate to justify federal court
second-guessing of a state agency’s exercise of its enforcement discre-
tion.  It appears that the district court engaged in just such an imper-
missible intrusion with respect to the DHEC’s enforcement action
against Laidlaw.  Principles of federalism and comity clearly recog-
nized in federal environmental statutes limit federal courts to defer-
ential review of state exercises of enforcement discretion, and those
principles preclude federal courts from second-guessing such agency
decisions.159  It is at least arguable that the “diligent prosecution”
standard is too vague to provide a meaningful standard for federal
courts to engage in detailed scrutiny of good faith state exercises of
enforcement discretion, and therefore, the courts must abstain based
on the doctrine of non-justiciability.
155. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
156. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 26 (1998).
157. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
158. See id. at 833.
159. See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding invalid
the EPA’s common practice of “overfiling,” i.e., filing a separate enforcement proceeding
against a violator when it concludes that a state agency did not impose an adequate penalty).
See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (declaring that principles of federal-
ism preclude a federal court from entertaining an action against a state official when there is an
available state court remedy); Union CATV, Inc. v. City of Sturgis, 107 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 1997)
(emphasizing that even when Congress specifically authorizes exclusive federal court review of
state agency actions, review is “very limited” and cannot involve “second-guessing”).
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I can imagine the Court issuing a decision in Laidlaw in which it
upholds the Fourth Circuit on the federalism ground discussed above,
as urged by South Carolina.  Such a decision might even be unani-
mous.  It would require the Justices to engage in a multi-step reason-
ing process that each of the Justices has embraced in several cases.  In
step one, the Court recognizes that states are separate sovereigns to
which principles of comity and federalism apply.160  In step two, the
Court recognizes that agency enforcement decisions are presump-
tively unreviewable exercises of enforcement discretion.161  In step
three, the Court recognizes that the “diligent prosecution” standard is
so ambiguous as to allow for any range of judicial review standards,
from a “de novo” substituting of its own judgment for that of the
agency, based solely on the record before the court, to a deferential
“quick look” review designed to identify only extreme bad faith or
collusion by the state regulator.162  In step four, the Court resolves the
linguistic ambiguity by applying a combination of the avoidance
canon—whereby a court should interpret an ambiguous statute to
avoid raising serious constitutional concerns163—and the clear state-
ment rule—whereby a court should not attribute to Congress an in-
tent to interfere with the performance of duties committed to the dis-
cretion of a sovereign State unless Congress has clearly authorized
such interference.164  In step five, the Court adopts a construction of
“diligent prosecution” that authorizes federal court review of state
agency exercises of enforcement discretion only in a narrow class of
extreme cases.
CONCLUSION
By now it should be apparent that I simply do not know how the
Court will decide Laidlaw.  In Parts II thru V, I have described the
basic elements of six hypothetical majority opinions that address
160. See, e.g., supra note 69 and sources cited.
161. See, e.g., Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (stating that the “recognition of the existence of
[agency] discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review
of agency decisions to refuse enforcement”).
162. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.  The lower courts have adopted a va-
riety of interpretations of the “diligent prosecution” standard, as the district court’s discussion
of the case law demonstrates.  See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. 470, 485-95 (D.S.C. 1995).  See also su-
pra note 159 (discussing Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894).
163. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (demonstrating a five-to-
four divide of the Justices with respect to the circumstances in which the avoidance canon ap-
plies).
164. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
I - ISSUES RAISED BY FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V. LAIDLAW - PIERCE.DOC 04/25/01  9:37 AM
236 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 11:207
some of the many important issues raised by Laidlaw.  Obviously, the
Court could decide Laidlaw by writing any of those opinions or
countless combinations and permutations of them.  I hope that the
Court writes an opinion that combines the elements of both the
opinion described in Part II and those in Part V.E.  However, my
track record in predicting the Court’s actions in this area of law is
poor, I should confess.  A majority of the present Justices seem to
reject as constitutionally impermissible those models of government
that I believe to be entirely consistent with the Constitution.
I am confident about only two attributes of the Court’s opinion
in Laidlaw.  First, the opinion will be another in a long series of cases
in which the Justices continue their debate with respect to competing
models of government.  It may resolve one or two issues, but it will
raise new issues and leave unresolved many of the questions that are
already being debated in lower courts.  Second, it will present its dis-
cussion of the issues in a manner that will tend more to obscure than
to illuminate the questions most ardently debated.  It is important for
all participants in this major debate on the competing models of gov-
ernment to penetrate the typically obscure and arcane doctrinal lan-
guage in order to understand the broad implications of adopting one
of the divergent models vieing for the support of a majority of Jus-
tices over another.
POSTSCRIPT:  THE ACTUAL DECISION
The Court decided Laidlaw on January 12, 2000, long after this
article was written.165  A seven-justice majority reversed the Fourth
Circuit.  Two Justices dissented and two Justices wrote brief concur-
rences.  To some extent, each of the issues discussed in Parts II and V
were addressed by the Court.  The majority definitively resolved sev-
eral major issues and created a considerable amount of new law.  In
many ways, the majority opinion represents a major setback for Jus-
tice Scalia’s attempt to persuade his colleagues that the Constitution
prohibits a private party from enforcing a public law.  Before Laid-
law, I counted four to six Justices who seemed to be sympathetic to
Justice Scalia’s view.166  After Laidlaw, I can count only two to three
Justices who appear sympathetic to his view.  The debate among the
Justices does not conclusively resolve all of the issues raised by Laid-
165. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
166. I based my beliefs primarily on the opinions in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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law, however.  It is safe to predict that the Court will continue the de-
bate about many of those matters in future cases.  I will now describe
the opinions in Laidlaw with reference to the issues discussed in Parts
II and V of this article.
A. Mootness
In Parts II and V.A, I noted that the Court traditionally has ap-
plied different tests for standing and mootness, and that the Fourth
Circuit had applied the standing test to support its mootness-based
holding.  I raised the question of whether the Court would undertake
an effort to change mootness law to correspond with standing law.
Contrastingly, I suggested that the Justices might use Laidlaw to
avowedly defend the retention of distinct tests for standing and
mootness.  They did.
The majority retained the traditional mootness doctrine making
it hard for a defendant to obtain a dismissal based on mootness once
a plaintiff has established standing.167  The majority recognized that
mootness law and standing law “differ in respects critical to the
proper resolution of this case,” even though both bodies of law are
based on the Case or Controversy clause of Article III.168  They reaf-
firmed that dichotomy on the strength of certain policy arguments
made by Friends of the Earth and the United States and which had
been accepted in many of the Court’s earlier opinions:
[A] defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice ordi-
narily does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice . . . .  If it did, courts would be compelled to
leave the defendant free to return to its old ways. . . . In accordance
with this principle, the standard . . . for determining whether a case
has been mooted by the defendant’s voluntary conduct is stringent:
A case might become moot if subsequent events [other than volun-
tary cessation] make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.169
The majority also retracted an arguably inconsistent dictum it
had included in some prior opinions.  The Court had previously de-
scribed mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.”170
The majority characterized that description as confusing and “not
comprehensive.”  Given the rest of the majority’s discussion of moot-
167. See 528 U.S. at 189-91.
168. See id. at 180.
169. Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
170. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980).
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ness, “not comprehensive”171 seemed to be a euphemism for “totally
inaccurate.”172
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined in by
Justice Thomas,173 objected to some aspects of the majority’s discus-
sion of the mootness issue.  Justice Scalia did “not disagree with the
conclusion that the Court reaches” on the mootness issue.174  He also
recognized that “mootness has some added wrinkles that standing
lacks.”175  Justice Scalia objected, however, to the majority’s rejection
of the definition of mootness as “standing set in a time frame.”176  He
expressed the view that the Court’s prior definition is accurate except
in the context of “voluntary cessation.”177  He also characterized the
“voluntary cessation doctrine [as] nothing more than an evidentiary
presumption . . . .”178  With the exception of that presumption, Justice
Scalia argued that the requirements for standing and mootness are
appropriately identical.179  He then concluded his discussion of moot-
ness by asserting that the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate “the
requisite personal interest” throughout the lawsuit in order to avoid
dismissal based on either mootness or lack of standing.180
Justice Scalia’s goal in his discussion of mootness is apparent.  He
is attempting to retain (or to resurrect) the definition of mootness as
“standing set in a time frame.”  By characterizing the voluntary cessa-
tion doctrine as a mere evidentiary presumption, Justice Scalia is try-
ing to lay the foundation for a holding in a subsequent case whereby a
defendant could rebut that presumption by showing that he is no
longer injuring the plaintiff.  That would create a legal regime in
which mootness and standing are identical with the exception of an
easily rebutted presumption.  Justice Scalia’s approach seems to be
entirely inconsistent with the reasoning in the majority opinion, how-
171. See 528 U.S. at 189-90.
172. Indeed, the majority seems to have moved the law of mootness partly down the path
urged in Evan Lee’s excellent article, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Moot-
ness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992).  As Professor Lee points out, the Court had never sug-
gested that mootness was based on Article III until it so-stated in dicta contained in a footnote
in a 1964 opinion, and there is no evidence that the Framers intended that the Case or Contro-
versy Clause create, or determine the contours of, a mootness doctrine.
173. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 210 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 212 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 212-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 213-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 214 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ever.  The majority’s discussion of the “voluntary cessation doctrine”
as an important policy-based element of the law of mootness181 de-
monstrates a very different viewpoint than Justice Scalia’s characteri-
zation of that doctrine as a mere rebuttable evidentiary presumption.
B. Redressability
In Part II.B, I noted that the Fourth Circuit based its holding on
the Court’s discussion of redressability in Steel Company, which
discussion was clearly susceptible to differing interpretations.  I sug-
gested the possibility that the Justices might use Laidlaw as a vehicle
to debate redressability.  They did.
The majority opinion discussed redressability at length and
changed the redressability requirement in ways that will make it much
easier for private citizens to enforce public laws.182  The majority dis-
tinguished Steel Company as a case in which the Court relied on re-
dressabilty only to support a narrow holding that civil penalties can-
not redress an injury caused by a “wholly past” violation of a
statute.183  By distinguishing Steel Company on that basis, and by
holding that the plaintiffs had standing in Laidlaw, the majority nec-
essarily repudiated the dicta in Steel Company in which that opinion
seemed to imply that civil penalties paid to the Treasury can never
redress a private plaintiff’s injury.184  Five Justices had appeared to ac-
cept that reasoning in Steel Company, but only two Justices continued
to approve of it in Laidlaw.  The other seven Justices explicitly re-
jected it.  Indeed, the Laidlaw majority concluded with the flat asser-
tion that “it is wrong to maintain that citizen plaintiffs . . . never have
standing to seek civil penalties.”185
The Laidlaw majority also engaged in a broader discussion of re-
dressability.  The majority announced two basic principles.  First, “all
civil penalties have some deterrent effect.”186  Second, the Court will
not second-guess congressional determinations that a statutorily-
authorized sanction will produce some deterrent effect.187
The majority’s treatment of redressability is a major victory for
those who believe that it is constitutionally permissible for Congress
181. See id. at 189-93.
182. See id. at 185-89.
183. See id. at 187-88.
184. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
185. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 185-86.
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to authorize private parties to enforce public laws.  The dicta in Steel
Company suggested the possibility that redressability would become
an insurmountable obstacle to implementation of that perspective.
After Laidlaw, redressability may disappear completely as a source of
concern for those pursuing statutorily-authorized awards on behalf of
the government.  Indeed, Justice Scalia chastised the majority for cre-
ating “a revolutionary new doctrine of standing that will permit the
entire body of public civil penalties to be handed over to enforcement
by private interests.”188
C. Injury and Causation
In Part V.C, I noted that the district court had found that Laid-
law’s violations had not caused any environmental harm.  I suggested
the possibility that the Justices might use that finding as the basis for
a debate about the contours of the injury and causation requirements
for standing.  They did.
The majority rejected Laidlaw’s argument that the district court’s
finding of “no harm” was inconsistent with a conclusion that the
plaintiff had standing.  The majority noted that “the relevant show-
ing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”189
It then ruled that the member affidavits submitted by the plaintiff
were sufficient to establish injury caused by Laidlaw’s violations.190
The affidavits described the affiants’ reductions in recreational uses
of the Tyger River attributable to their knowledge that Laidlaw was
violating its permit and to their concerns that those violations were
creating hazards to human health and to fisheries resources.  The
majority characterized the affiants’ concerns as “reasonable,” and
held that changes in behavior based on reasonable fear that violations
engaged in by the defendant are having harmful effects on water
quality are sufficient to establish a concrete injury.191
Justice Scalia expressed strong disagreement with the majority’s
treatment of injury and causation.192  In his view, the affidavits were
fatally deficient in two ways.  First, the affiants should have been re-
quired to prove the adverse effects with particularity193—for example,
how many times would an affiant have used the river but for Laid-
188. Id. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 181.
190. See id. at 181-84.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 198-202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 198-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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law’s violations?  Second, the affiants should have been required to
prove that their changes in conduct were based on real water quality
problems caused by Laidlaw’s violations, rather than mere beliefs that
Laidlaw’s violations were causing environmental harm.194  To Justice
Scalia, the district court’s finding of no environmental harm rendered
it impossible for the affiants to prove that they were injured by Laid-
law’s violations.195  Justice Scalia concluded his discussion of injury
and causation with the assertion that: “[i]f there are permit violations,
and a member of a plaintiff environmental organization lives near the
offending plant, it would be difficult not to satisfy today’s lenient
standard.”196  That is a fair portrayal of the effect of the majority’s
treatment of injury and causation.  Before the decision in Laidlaw,
many courts were applying interpretations of the injury and causation
requirements that:  1) forced plaintiffs to incur high costs by present-
ing voluminous evidence on injury and causation in lengthy and com-
plicated hearings on standing, and 2) made it practically impossible
for plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof on the two issues.197  Laid-
law should bring that practice to a halt.
D. The Take Care Clause
In Part V.D, I conjectured that the Laidlaw case could provide
an occasion for the Justices to debate the merits of Justice Scalia’s
theory that the Take Care clause in Article II precludes anyone but
the Executive Branch from enforcing a public law.  It is difficult to
characterize the opinions in this respect.
The majority made no reference to Article II.  In a brief concur-
ring opinion, Justice Kennedy referred to “difficult and fundamental
questions” raised under Article II when Congress purports to
authorize private parties to exact public fines.198  He stated that he was
joining the majority opinion with the understanding that the Court
was not addressing those questions, because they had not been ade-
quately identified in the petition for certiorari, discussed in the briefs,
194. See id. at 199-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing as a “sham” the majority’s finding
that the plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact “even in the face of a finding that the environment
was not demonstrably harmed”).
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107 (4th
Cir. 1999); Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d
111 (3d Cir. 1997).  See also Pierce, supra note 81, at 1332-39.
198. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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or discussed by the Fourth Circuit.199  Justices Scalia and Thomas
made a similar observation in their dissenting opinion.200  Thus, as a
formal matter, Laidlaw does not resolve the Article II issue.
As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to imagine how the
majority could write a subsequent opinion embracing Justice Scalia’s
theory that would still be consistent with the majority opinion in
Laidlaw.  Justice Scalia accurately described the majority opinion as
“permitting law enforcement to be placed in the hands of private in-
dividuals”201 and as turning “over to private citizens the function of
enforcing the law.”202  Moreover, the majority did address many of the
concerns that underlie Justice Scalia’s theory.  The majority noted
that “the federal government retains the power to foreclose a citizen
suit by undertaking its own action” and that “the statute allows the
Administrator of the EPA to ‘intervene as a matter of right’ and bring
the Government’s views to the attention of the court.”203
E. Federalism and “Diligent Prosecution”
In Part V.E, I suggested the possibility that the Justices would
use Laidlaw as a vehicle to debate a federalism issue—that is,
whether a federal court’s decision to evaluate in detail, and even sec-
ond-guess, a state agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion is con-
sistent with the combination of the principles of federalism and the
ambiguous “diligent prosecution” standard contained in the citizen-
suit provisions of federal environmental statutes.  The majority ad-
dressed that issue only in a purely descriptive footnote.204  Justice
Scalia took on the issue in a lengthy footnote in which he noted that
the Court had not resolved the issue, commented that the Fourth Cir-
cuit would be free to address it on remand, and expressed his sympa-
thy with the argument.205
I assume that Laidlaw and South Carolina will accept Justice
Scalia’s invitation to develop this argument thoroughly in the remand
proceeding before the Fourth Circuit.  It seems to be the only re-
maining grounds upon which Laidlaw has any realistic prospect of
199. See id.
200. See id. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 188 n.4.
204. See id. at 186 n.2.
205. See id. at 188 n.4.
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success.  I continue to believe that this argument has a good chance of
being accepted by both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION TO POSTSCRIPT
The majority opinion in Laidlaw is a major victory for environ-
mentalists, supporters of allowing private citizens to enforce public
laws, and proponents of broad access to the courts.  In fact, from the
perspective of each of those groups, it is easily the most favorable de-
cision handed down in the last decade.  It almost certainly does not
represent the Court’s last word on the subject, however.
The Court has failed to be consistent in this area of decision-
making.  It could retract, recharacterize, or amend significantly al-
most any of the important statements in the majority opinion in
Laidlaw in a future case, just as the Laidlaw majority retracted, re-
characterized and amended significantly some of the most important
statements in the majority opinions in Lujan and Steel Company  The
Court has surprised me with at least one standing opinion
contradicting its recent, prior opinions in each of the past eight
terms.206  I have reached the point where I can no longer be surprised
when the Court makes major changes in the law of standing over as-
tonishingly brief periods of time.
The Court’s most frequent method of changing the law of stand-
ing is to recharacterize its precedents.  Thus, for instance, when a
majority of Justices wanted to hold that banks had standing to review
an agency decision favoring credit unions207—and were faced with a
recent inconsistent decision in which a majority had held that a union
lacked standing to obtain review of an agency decision favoring em-
ployers208—the majority distinguished the precedent by recharacter-
izing it as signifying a different proposition that the Court had en-
tirely avoided in that prior opinion.209
The majority and dissenting opinions in Laidlaw engage in a fas-
cinating battle of the footnotes210 in which the Justices debate the
206. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 1750-58.
207. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
208. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517
(1991).
209. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 1753-55, 1757-58.
210. Cf. 528 U.S. at 188 n.4 (discussing the fact that the Linda R.S. Court relied on the
premise that a deliquent father would not be able to pay child support if imprisoned), and 528
U.S. at 203 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s characterization and in-
stead quoted the Court's statement that “[t]he prospect that prosecution will, at least in the fu-
ture, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.”) (quoting Linda
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proper portrayal of one of the most frequently cited precedents in the
modern law of standing—the Court’s 1973 decision in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D.211  Linda R.S. was the first case in which the Court an-
nounced the causation and redressability requirements for Article III
standing, and one of the few cases in which the Court has adopted in-
terpretations of those requirements that render them virtually impos-
sible to satisfy.212
Linda R.S. was an unlikely vehicle to announce a major change
in standing law.  A Texas statute authorized criminal prosecution and
potential incarceration of a father who refuses to make child support
payments.  Richard D. was such a father.  Linda R.S. demanded that
the local district attorney prosecute Richard D.  He refused to do so,
apparently because the child in question was illegitimate.  Linda R.S.
then sought an injunction that would compel the district attorney to
prosecute Richard D.  The Court could have simply dismissed the
case by applying the centuries-old doctrine prohibiting a court from
interfering with exercises of prosecutorial discretion.213  Instead, a
five-justice majority wrote an opinion in which it held that Linda R.S.
lacked standing.
The majority concluded that there was no causal relationship be-
tween the district attorney’s decision refusing to prosecute and Rich-
ard D.’s refusal to pay, and that consequently, a judicial decision
requiring the district attorney to prosecute would not be able to re-
dress Linda R.S.’s injury.214  In a critical passage, the majority rea-
soned that “if appellant were granted the requested relief, it would
result only in the jailing of the child’s father.  The prospect that
prosecution will . . . result in payment of support can, at best, be
termed only speculative.”215  In other words, the majority considered it
“speculative” whether an individual confronted with a choice be-
tween two years of incarceration and making child support payments
would choose to make the payments.  More broadly, the majority
seemed to say that the longstanding belief that criminal law shapes
conduct is “only speculative.”  At the time, it was hard to take the
majority’s bizarre reasoning with respect to causation and redress-
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973)).
211. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
212. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 51, at 34-38.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1999); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868).
214. 410 U.S. at 617-619.
215. Id. at 618.
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ability seriously.  It seemed far more likely that the majority actually
was motivated by its belief that courts rarely, if ever, should review
exercises in prosecutorial discretion.  Moreover, the majority opinion
included numerous passages that tended to confirm the latter inter-
pretation.  To that end, the Court distinguished cases in which there is
a statute “expressly conferring standing,”216 referred to “the unique
context of a challenge to a criminal statute,”217 acknowledged “the
special status of criminal prosecutions in our system,”218 referenced
“the Court’s prior decisions [that] hold that a citizen lacks standing to
contest the policies of a prosecuting authority,”219 and summarized its
ultimate holding by declaring that “a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution of another.”220
Justice Scalia relied heavily on Linda R.S. in his dissenting opin-
ion in Laidlaw.221  He treated the causation and redressability reason-
ing in Linda R.S. as if it were broadly applicable to all standing dis-
putes.  The majority responded in a long textural footnote.222  It stated
that the dissent’s “reliance is sorely misplaced.”  It went on to charac-
terize Linda R.S. as a decision limited to the unique context of an at-
tempt to persuade a court to interfere with an exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion.  The dissent responded in a footnote in which it
referred to the majority’s characterization of Linda R.S. as “imagina-
tive.”223
I am delighted that the majority has distinguished Linda R.S. as
an opinion uniquely applicable to exercises of prosecutorial discre-
tion.  I have long argued that the case should be so interpreted.224
There is one problem, however.  Whatever Linda R.S. was originally
intended to mean in 1973, the Court has since relied on it in numer-
ous opinions wherein the Court has obviously interpreted it as, in
fact, applying to standing disputes of all stripes.225  Thus, the Laidlaw
majority relied heavily on recharacterization of Linda R.S. as a means
216. See id. at 617.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 619.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See 528 U.S. at 203-04, 208-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 188 n.4.
223. See id. at 203 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 51, at 39.
225. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998); Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
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of distinguishing it and adopting a much broader interpretation of the
causation and redressability requirements.
The problem with characterization and recharacterization of
precedents as a technique of decision-making is that it can be used in
perpetuity by any Justice or combination of Justices, thus resulting in
a confusing body of law.  Indeed, it is quite possible that Justice Scalia
will be successful in persuading four of his colleagues to recharacter-
ize Linda R.S. as a broadly applicable precedent in the next major
standing case the Court decides.  Therefore, I am unwilling to assume
that the major victory for proponents of expansive standing deriving
from Laidlaw will prove permanent.  I foresee, for instance, that citi-
zen plaintiffs will likely have to defend an assault on their standing
led by Justice Scalia, based on his theory that the Take Care clause of
Article II prohibits all congressional delegations of law enforcement
authority to anyone but those within the plenary control of the Presi-
dent.  At a minimum, the proponents of broad standing must be pre-
pared to relitigate this issue many times over and to defend it against
attacks from numerous directions.
